NEU CY 5770 Software Vulnerabilities and Security

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Real-world Examples

Morris Worm

{

```
The vulnerability was in fingerd from
4.3BSD Unix, the version of the
Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)
released in 1986.
```

```
* Finger server.
 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
main(argc, argv)
        char *argv[];
        register char *sp;
        char line[512];
        struct sockaddr in sin;
        int i, p[2], pid, status;
        FILE *fp;
        char *av[4];
        i = sizeof (sin);
        if (getpeername(0, &sin, &i) < 0)
                fatal(argv[0], "getpeername");
        line[0] = ' (0';
        gets(line);
        sp = line;
        av[0] = "finger";
        i = 1;
```

https://www.tuhs.org/cgi-bin/utree.pl?file=4.3BSD/usr/src/etc/fingerd.c

OpenBSD 2.8 ftpd Off-by-One

In 2000 a buffer overflow was discovered in the piece of code handling directory names in the FTP daemon included in OpenBSD distribution. The vulnerable piece of code is shown here (/src/libexec/ftpd/ftpd.c):

MAXPATHLEN is 1024

```
replydirname(name, message)
   const char *name, *message;
{
   char npath [MAXPATHLEN];
   int i;
   for (i = 0; *name != '\0' && i < sizeof(npath) - 1; i++, name++) {
        npath[i] = *name;
        if (*name == `"`)
                npath[++i] = ```;
   }
   npath[i] = \ \ 0';
   reply(257, "\"%s\" %s", npath, message);
```

A Recent Example JuiceBox 40 Smart EV Charging Station

JuiceBox

A classic stack-based buffer overflow

The Gecko OS provides a template for setting log formats, including tags such as timestamp, SSID, host, port, and MAC address. The template has a 32-character limit, including a NULL byte for termination. Each tag, such as @t for the timestamp, uses two characters, allowing a maximum of 15 tags per template. When the @t timestamp tag is used, it outputs 23 bytes into the message buffer, meaning 15 timestamp tags would generate 345 bytes. However, the buffer is only 192 bytes long. This vulnerability was uncovered through firmware analysis, which helped the team locate the function responsible for handling the message format.

https://vicone.com/blog/from-pwn2own-automotive-a-stack-based-buffer-overflow-vulnerability-in-juic ebox-40-smart-ev-charging-station

A Recent Example JuiceBox 40 Smart EV Charging Station

JuiceBox 40 (CVE-2024-23938)

```
char scratch buffer[132];
char formatted msg buffer[192];
char * dst = formatted msg buffer;
11 ...
if ((format tag == 't') &&
   (print timestamp to string(scratch buffer, 1) == SUCCESS))
  memcpy(dst, scratch buffer, 10);
  dst[10] = ' ';
  dst[11] = '|';
  dst[12] = ' ';
  memcpy(dst + 13, scratch buffer + 11, 8);
  dst[21] = ':';
  dst[22] = ' ';
  dst = dst + 23;
  *dst = '\0';
```

https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-24/Presentations/US24-Alkemade-Low-Energy-to-High-Energy-Hacking-N earby-EV-Chargers-Over-Bluetooth-Wednesday.pdf?_gl=1*1s6dkoi*_gcl_au*NTY2MjE0MjI2LjE3Mjk1NTc 4Mjg.*_ga*MTIxOTgyOTExMy4xNzI5NTU3ODI5*_ga_K4JK67TFYV*MTcyOTU1NzgyOC4xLjAuMTcyOTU1N zgyOC4wLjAuMA..&_ga=2.169853153.1304097414.1729557829-1219829113.1729557829


A Recent Example JuiceBox 40 Smart EV Charging Station

JuiceBox 40 (CVE-2024-23938)

> What if we provide multiple @t tags?

- > At most 15 times, each using up **23** bytes
- > 15 * 23 = 345 bytes, while the stack allocated buffer is 192 bytes long
- > No canaries, no ASLR, but some limitations on allowed byte values

Template



Tesla hacked, 24 zero-days demoed at Pwn2Own Automotive 2024



Finding Buffer Overflow in Source Code

Possible Approaches

- Lexical static code analysis
- Semantic static code analysis
- Dynamic program analysis, e.g., Valgrind



Possible Approaches

- Fuzzing: breaking software/hardware with *random* inputs
 - Blackbox vs. whitebox
 - Coverage-based, mutation-based, grammar-based
 - Symbolic execution, concolic execution
 - Re-hosting
- AI and Large Language Models

https://www.fuzzingbook.org/